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NOTE 
1. It soon becomes obvious that Wright's un-grammatical use of plural 
pronouns with singular antecedents stems from a politically correct desire to 
be inclusive. Such infelicities are of negligible importance when he writes in 
his own hand. But in an exegetical work the distortion this practice brings to 
the Greek text of the New Testament is inexcusable. In his biblical citations, 
Wright repeatedly substitutes "they" and "their" for "he" and "his," "family" 
for "brethren," "Judeans" for "Jews," etc. which are simply mistranslations of 
the text. 
God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political Thought, by 
Jeremy Waldron. Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp., 263, $60.00 
(cloth); $22.00 (paper). 
Hobbes, Locke, and Confusion'S Masterpiece: An Examination of Seventeenth-
Century Political Philosophy, by Ross Harrison. Cambridge University Press, 
2003. Pp. 281, $65.00 (cloth); $23.00 (paper). 
RICK FAIRBANKS, Northland College 
In these two texts we find discussions of 17th century political philoso-
phy that acknowledge both that Locke's Two Treatises and Hobbes' works 
on natural law are period pieces, distinctively shaped by their times, but 
also classics, in Harrison's phrase "transportable" to our time. Both 
Waldron and Harrison take the location of these classic texts in what 
Harrison calls a "religiously saturated" age to be an obstacle to their trans-
port to our secular or, as Harrison styles it, our agnostic age. Their respec-
tive responses to this putative obstacle lead them in opposite directions. 
Harrison takes Locke to be largely confined to his own age because of the 
religious preoccupations that he shares with his contemporaries. He takes 
Hobbes to be the greatest political philosopher of the age because, for 
Hobbes, religion bears no weight in political philosophy. Waldron argues 
that the religious cannot be bracketed from Locke's argument for and, 
therefore, his conception of equality. According to Waldron religious 
claims are necessarily weight bearing in Locke's account of equality. 
Waldron further warns that we bracket the religious argument for equality 
at our peril or, perhaps, at the cost of incoherence or false consciousness. 
The warning is consistent with his frequently expressed disagreement with 
the Cambridge School's reading of Locke as simply a period piece. While 
Waldron warns that agnosticism imperils commitment to equality, 
Harrison opts for an agnostic account for agnostic times. 
Waldron sets out to show, contrary he tells us to his own earlier view, 
that "Locke's equality claims are not separable from the theological claim 
that shapes and organizes them" (p. 82). The argument for this central 
assertion is systematically set out in chapter 3, "Species and the Shape of 
Equality," and defended and articulated in subsequent chapters. After 
asserting the centrality of equality in Locke's political thinking, Waldron 
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argues, despite language suggesting otherwise in the Second Treatise, that 
the attribution of equality cannot for Locke turn on species membership. 
This is because Locke argued in the Essay that species are nominal 
essences; and that, therefore, the human species has no real essence. What 
Locke needs, says Waldron, is a "range" property, a property describing 
real resemblances between individuals in the class of equals and further 
specification of range or threshold that is not arbitrary. We must have a 
reason to isolate a particular property as definitive of the range. Locke's 
candidate for the range property is "'the power of Abstracting,' the capaci-
ty to reason on the basis of general ideas" (p. 75). Locke focuses on this 
property because it is the power of abstracting that accounts for our capaci-
ty to reason to God's existence and to infer our duties from our under-
standing of God. The deep reason I should recognize another as equal 
who is like me in having the power of abstracting, is that I see that she, like 
me, is the "Workmanship" of "one Sovereign Master," and furthermore, 
that she, like me, has the ability to understand herself and her aims as such. 
This theological basis for equality cannot be bracketed from the concep-
tion of equality since, Waldron contends, our way of arguing for a particu-
lar concept may constrain the way we understand the concept. Waldron 
takes this claim to be exemplified by Mill's harm principle. Mill's under-
standing of harm is necessarily sensitive; i.e., not separable from, the rea-
sons Mill offers in support of the harm principle. And so too, argues 
Waldron, Locke's theological argument for equality constrains his concep-
tion of equality. 
Two conclusions are possible on the basis of this argument. The first, 
most obvious and explicitly asserted by Waldron, is that no egalitarian 
position shorn of Locke's justification of equality is Lockean egalitarianism. 
This is an interesting, if not earthshaking conclusion. If Waldron is right 
(and it would appear that a growing number of scholars including 
Harrison would agree with him) so much the worse for Waldron circa 
1982; so much the worse for Nozick, so much the worse for anyone who 
purports to offer a non-theologically warranted version of Lockean egali-
tarianism. The second, more interesting, but never either quite asserted or 
decisively denied by Waldron, is that any conception of equality has to be 
a Lockean conception, because there is no non-question begging way to set 
the threshold apart from Lockean theological considerations. At the end of 
the chapter three argument, he says that "[the atheist] will be at a loss to 
defend any particular line or threshold, in a non-question begging way" (p. 
81). The atheist either arbitrarily defines a threshold for equality or self-
deceptively employs the theologically defined threshold while denying 
that he is doing so. So, it seems, no conception of equality that isn't a 
Lockean conception is possible. But at the end of the book the claim is 
much weaker, vaguely prophetic. We think we can understand equality 
apart from a religious foundation, but Locke would think we are taking a 
risk in so understanding equality. Waldron is "afraid it is not entirely 
clear, given our experience of a world and a century in which politics and 
public reason have cut loose from these foundations, that his cautions and 
suspicions were unjustified" (p. 243). At this point Waldron seems to rest 
his claim that theology cannot be bracketed from our conception of equali-
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ty more on the historically central role of theological warrant in arguing for 
equality than on the logical indispensability of religious warrants. 
Three replies can be made to the claim that we attempt to bracket the 
theological from Locke's account of equality at our peril: 1) the warning 
against bracketing is unwarranted; 2) the charge of the atheist's question-
begging is as well directed against Locke as the atheist; and 3) given 
Waldron's own insistence that warrants offered in favor of a particular 
conception can constrain the content of the concept, it seems clear that 
Locke's conception of equality falls under the shadow of Locke's argument 
for equality with troubling anti-egalitarian consequences. 
The warning is unwarranted since it would seem that equality is no 
less robust in our secular age than it was in Locke's time. If anything, the 
commitment to equality seems more central now than then. Further, we 
know that there are enterprises that historically required a theological 
foundation but that thrive after bracketing has occurred. Here modern nat-
ural science comes to mind and, in particular, the role that believing that 
the universe was the creation of an omnicompetent creator played, for fig-
ures such as Boyle and Newton, in warranting the enterprise of investigat-
ing the universe. 
It is not clear why Waldron thinks the atheist cannot offer a non-ques-
tion begging, non-arbitrary threshold for equality. In fact he discusses 
Hobbes' range property-that the weakest has strength enough to kill the 
strongest-and Rawls' -the capacity for moral personality-and gives no 
reason to believe that either is arbitrary. Clearly the former isn't arbitrary, 
if one thinks that the most pressing political question is how we are to war-
rant the political authority necessary to enforce agreements and to ensure 
against lapsing into the state of nature. But then one can also ask why 
Locke's threshold isn't arbitrary. Certainly any defender of animal rights 
or the moral considerability of animals would insist that Locke's threshold 
is arbitrary, as would anyone looking to protect the rights of the profound-
ly retarded, the comatose, those suffering the last stages of Alzheimer's, 
etc. To answer these objections one might distinguish political equality 
from equality of consideration or some such. Waldron doesn't in fact do 
this, and since he never explains what Locke's conception of equality is 
of-resources, consideration, basic rights, welfare, life chances, etc.-it is 
hard to judge who is and who isn't drawing the line arbitrarily. 
The final problem for Waldron's attempt to transport a Lockean concep-
tion of equality to our time, theological warrant intact, arises out of the 
argument Waldron makes that "shadows [are] cast by the principle of 
basic equality on the whole apparatus of property and economy" (p. 170). 
Locke's conception of property is not adequately explained, says Waldron, 
by a "mixing" model of labor. Justifying the conversion of "waste" land to 
fruitful private property requires the teleology of a divine injunction to 
preserve ourselves and others. Locke's constraint on spoliation is similarly 
motivated. The shadow metaphor is instructive: the argument for private 
property lies under the shadow of equality. So, on Waldron's claim that 
arguments for concepts can determine their contents, we should expect our 
senses of "property," "equality," and "person" to be influenced by an 
argument for private property based on an injunction to charity arising out 
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of a recognition of the equality of persons. If the justification for property 
arises from the duty to promote the survival of others, a duty recognizable 
to anyone with abstract reason, then won't the infantilization or dehuman-
ization of any group that persistently ignores this duty likely occur? Locke 
seems to think anyone who refuses to cultivate the land-e.g., Native 
Americans--cannot be regarded as equals or as fully human. Of course 
this doesn't/ollow from Locke's view. And Waldron succeeds in showing 
that Locke didn't intend to "dehumanize the native Americans," but that's 
beside the point. By showing that the way we argue for conceptions can 
determine the way we understand concepts and so, raising the question 
that we might not be able to bracket Locke's theological basis from our 
own conceptions of equality, Waldron thereby implies that the the Lockean 
conception may itself be tainted by its role in the argument for private 
property. So, even though Locke didn't intend to dehumanize Native 
Americans, it isn't surprising either that his view of property leads us in 
that direction. To his credit Waldron is more effective responding to a sim-
ilar kind of worry about Locke's claim that atheists should not be tolerated. 
The focus here has been narrow and any impression of a general criti-
cism of the book is unintended. As has been said, Waldron shows that the-
ological warrant cannot be bracketed from Locke's argument for equality 
and, so too, that theological content cannot be bracketed from the sense of 
equality for Locke. The extension and defense of the central argument in 
other chapters-e.g., in his discussion of Locke's view of the relation 
between husbands and wives (chapter 2), in his discussion of Locke's view 
of property (chapter 6), in his discussion of the dearth of New Testament 
texts in Locke's account of equality (chapter 7), in his discussion of Locke's 
unwillingness to extend tolerance to atheists (chapter 8)-are interesting, 
careful, well argued, and nicely attuned to the Lockean texts. Waldron has 
obviously been living with these texts for a long time and is a sure, if not 
always persuasive, guide through the thickets of Lockean texts. 
While Waldron warns us that we bracket the theology from Locke's 
view at our peril, it becomes clear that in Ross Harrison's Hobbes, Locke, and 
Confusion'S Masterpiece we find the classically liberal sensibility that our jus-
tification of the state cannot rest on religious or theological premises, given 
the depth and breadth o~religious disagreement and given the potential 
(oft actualized in the 17t century) of religious disagreement to lead to 
bloodshed. The only arguments that can speak to us from this "religiously 
saturated" and "biblically soaked" century (one cannot help but conclude 
that Harrison thinks believers are all wet) are those in which God has no 
weight bearing role. So, in agreeing with Waldron, that we can't get the 
God out of Locke, we must acknowledge that Locke cannot speak to us or 
at least that he cannot speak to us as some of his followers (Nozick, again) 
would claim. We cannot get the God out of Locke's account of property, 
his understanding of natural law (since law requires makers and punish-
ers), or his account of how we learn what is morally required of us (since in 
The Reasonableness o/Christianity Locke is forced to admit reason's failure in 
producing morality and, hence, to admit the necessary role of revelation as 
a moral teacher). 
Harrison turns, for one chapter, to the efforts of Grotius and Pufendorf 
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to produce the traditional claims of natural law without depending on a 
special revelation of God's will. While Harrison does not argue that 
Grotius and Pufendorf fail in the justificatory endeavor, he does seem to 
doubt whether their account of how we are motivated to follow natural 
law-the separate forces of conscience and opinion-is adequate to the fact 
that politics is concerned with real power. So, for an account that gives us 
both the content of traditional natural law and an adequate account of 
motivation, we must, argues Harrison, turn to Hobbes, "the greatest politi-
cal philosopher." 
Harrison's reading of Hobbes is very close, produced by a constant 
good-natured hectoring of texts from Leviathan, De Cive, and The Elements of 
Law. I will here adumbrate the main moves in the reading of Hobbes. First, 
the good reasons Hobbes provides for seeking the security of the state are 
prudential, "head in the bed" (a reference to the famous episode in The 
Godfather) reasons. It is self-preservation that drives us to choose the 
Leviathan. To the degree that we can leverage the state out of the most 
individual, self-interested prudential reason, Harrison says, to that degree 
will our argument be dialectically robust. Shades of Rawls on the circum-
stances of justice, one is inclined to say. Second, for Hobbes God plays no 
weight bearing role in deriving the traditional claims of natural law 
because, for Hobbes, political science is a science proper, and religious 
claims are based on faith not knowledge in a properly scientific sense. 
Harrison hastens to add that Hobbes thinks that he can also warrant natur-
al law claims with biblically based arguments (a hint of overlapping con-
sensus here) but that, unlike Locke, he thinks those arguments are dispens-
able. Third, natural laws in the state of nature provide only hypothetical 
imperatives; for example, we are obligated to keep agreements only if we 
think others will also keep agreements. We have good reasons to keep 
agreements only if others do, and hence good reasons to want others to 
keep agreements, but we can have no assurance that agreements will be 
kept in the absence of a power that will enforce agreements. Hence, we 
have good reasons to want the Leviathan. However, fourth, if consent, 
understood in a contractual sense, is necessary to authorize the Leviathan, 
then we have the practical problem of avoiding a regress of agreements to 
keep agreements. We may see that we need Leviathan, because we see 
that our ability to make moral evaluations is exactly what makes our dis-
agreements intractable, but we can also see that we have no way of con-
tracting our way out of the nasty state of nature. We are haunted by pris-
oner's dilemmas and the prospect of free riders. Therefore, fifth, Harrison 
argues that for Hobbes consent has to mean mere agreement of wills, a 
simultaneous realization that our lives depend on exiting the state of 
nature, of, as he vividly pictures it, simultaneously dropping our spears. 
Hobbes' understanding of this phenomenon is a scientific understanding-
the move from state of nature to civil state is to be understood on analogy 
to the move from caterpillar to butterfly. That is, it just naturally happens. 
So, sixth, Harrison gives a reading of Hobbes that is not a game theoretic 
reading. This because the calculation we make in the state of nature is not 
one of comparative advantage, but rather of what it will take to survive. 
We are driven into the state by fear. We fearfully lay down our spear for 
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the perfectly good reason that we fear even more being in a circle of poten-
tial spear throwers, of a war of all against all. 
This is a dense summary no doubt, and it is similarly doubtless that jus-
tice can't be done to the reading in a paragraph. This is a book that repays 
careful reading and rereading. One reward for readers, even for the many 
who will not agree with Harrison's judgment about Hobbes' relevance and 
greatness, is Harrison's careful questioning of the role consent plays in all 
four of the figures considered. Again and again Harrison finds, that the 
language of consent covers real rhetorical work being done by the deliver-
ance of reason or natural law, the calculation of utilities, the recognition of 
power, etc. The need for this rhetorical work rests in part on the difficulties 
of making any story about actual or tacit consent do justificatory work. 
On Harrison's reading Hobbes' greatness consists largely in his trans-
portability to our age. But exactly how transportable, on Harrison's read-
ing, is hard to judge, given that he never puts Hobbes into conversation 
with 21st century political questions (although he gets Hobbes part way 
towards us by putting him into conversation with 19th century thinkers 
like Bentham) and given the dearth of discussion of the Hobbesian com-
monwealth. Harrison argues that the case for Hobbes' transportability rests 
on the thinness of Hobbes' moral presuppositions. He bootstraps a justifi-
cation of and a motivation to form the state without appeal to God, either 
as the source of the content or the enforcer of natural law, while adverting 
only to reasons of the prudential "head-in-the-be" sort. Moreover, unlike 
Locke, and to his credit says Harrison, Hobbes realizes that natural law 
claims provide only hypothetical imperatives. It is good for us to keep 
agreements and to have agreements kept, just in case we can be confident 
that agreements will be kept. But we can have that confidence only if we 
subordinate our wills to that of the Leviathan. On Harrison's reading the 
genius of Hobbes is that he provides a political solution to his cenhlry's 
problem of confronting" confusion's masterpiece" -the seemingly 
intractable fact of moral and religious disagreement. In Hobbes we get the 
goods we recognize in natural law only if Leviathan gives them. 
So it looks like Harrison transports Hobbes to our time in the guise of 
legal positivism. Fairness requires the "looks like" caveat, since Harrison 
does not put the transported Hobbes into conversation with this century in 
the way Waldron does Locke. But it looks like this is a Hobbes Robert 
Bork could love-given what Rawls calls "the fact of a plurality of reason-
able but incompatible comprehensive doctrines," the only solution to the 
problem of permanent moral and religious disagreement is for the sover-
eign, Leviathan, to decide. While it is interesting and possibly timely, given 
a variety of communitarian and republican criticisms of liberalism, to 
argue that politics plays an essential role in making morality possible, it is 
also unsettling, to say the least, to read in the last line of the book that poli-
tics plays an essential role ill resolving moral and intellectual conflicts. 
This is especially so, given that, at least in Western democracies, Leviathan 
speaks in the voice of the majority, given Hobbes' absolutism with respect 
to the prerogative of the sovereign, given Harrison's argument that the 
claims of natural law are, in Hobbes, only given effect by the Leviathan. 
The specter of Hobbes' Leviathan, perhaps especially in a democratic form 
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(Mill's tyrannical majority it would seem), might well incline us to hold out 
for moral constraints on politics, on law, even if they be of the thick, no 
doubt objectionable, Lockean kind. 
An Essay on Divine Authority by Mark C. Murphy. Cornell Studies in the 
Philosophy of Religion, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 2002, 197 pages. 
GARY MAR, Department of Philosophy, Stony Brook University 
Mark Murphy's An Essay on Divine Authority is a new and original work 
in the distinguished Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion edited 
by William Alston. The new Problem of Divine Authority is that of (1) 
answering whether God has practical authority over created rational 
beings, and (2) providing an explanation of the extent of that authority. 
Why has this problem been unduly neglected? 
Philosophers have failed to see the Problem of Divine Authority, accord-
ing to Murphy, because they have been blinded by widely held philosophi-
cal assumptions. On the one hand, philosophers who assume that "it is a 
platitude that God is authoritative" regard the thesis as tautological like 
'bachelors are unmarried' and hence trivially true. On the other hand, 
philosophers who regard Euthyphro's dilemma as decisive against Divine 
Command ethics, assume that the dilemma refutes the Divine authority 
thesis. Both assumptions, Murphy argues, are unwarranted. Euthyphro's 
dilemma is directed against normative Divine Command theories of ethics 
that postulate God's authority as a supreme moral principle; however, the 
defender of Divine Authority is not committed to such a view. Moreover, 
even the truism 'all bachelors are unmarried' becomes an open question 
when regarded as "a de rc question, a question about why these particular 
bachelors are unmarried." The Problem of Divine Authority is not so easi-
Iv dismissed. 
~ Murphy's examination depends on distinguished between the objective 
claim of God's being the supreme authority and the subjective claim of 
God's being practically authoritative for me. Practical authority, according to 
Murphy's explication, is a relationship in which the dictates of one party 
(e.g., God) gives another party (e.g., a creative rational being) a decisive rea-
son for action. The reason for action is a fact that must be complete (it 
includes" all that makes an action choiceworthy") and compact (it includes 
only those facts that are, at least in part, constitutive of choiceworthiness). 
Given the infinity of God's good-making attributes and the finitude of creat-
ed rational beings, however, one wonders whether the requirement of com-
pleteness could be fulfilled in principle, let alone be required for rationality. 
Moreover, God's having causal control over an agent's actions does 
not imply that God is practically authoritative. For God to be practically 
authoritative over an agent, Murphy explains, God's telling agent x to 
perform an action cp must "constitutively actualize" a reason for x to cp, 
namely, a reason, which if undefeated, is decisive. Explaining just how 
God's dictates might constitutively actualize a reason leads Murphy to 
articulate three grades of Divine Authority. 
